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NOTES
Constitutional Standards for
Suspicionless Student Drug Testing:
A Moving Target
BY BENJAMIN GERALD DUSING*
I comprehend the Court's opinion as reserving the question whether [a
school district] could inpose routine drug testing not only on those
seeking to engage with others in team sports, but on all students required
to attend school
[I]t is necessary to establish some boundaries so as not to sanction
"routine drug testing on all students required to attend school."2
INTRODUCTION
espite persistent debate as to its propnety and effect,' America
continues to wage a "War on Drugs."4 Suspicionless drug
testing has emerged as a principal weapon m this war and the
J.D. expected 2001, Umversity of Kentucky. The author would like to thank
Professor William H. Fortune for ns advice and support, Amy Glenn for her
editorial suggestions, and his family for their unwavering love and patience.
IVemoma Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
2 Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415,425 (7th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)), cert. denied, 119
S.Ct. 1254 (1999).
' See Michael Hallam, A Casualty of the "War on Drugs". Mandatory,
Suspicionless Drug Testing ofStudentAthletes in Vemoma School District 47J v
Acton, 74N.C. L. REV 833,833 (1996) (arguing that "the 'War on Drugs' has been
largely unsuccessful on all fronts m the interdiction of drug imports and eradication
of drug use").
4 See id. President Nixon initiated the War on Drugs on a limited scale in 1972.
The effort developed to the extent that President Bush appointed a "drug tzar" and
spent $40 billion on the program. See id. at n.3.
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practice has attained a firm foothold m American society I The average
American may now be tested multiple times over the course of a lifetime
and for various purposes.
Students have not eluded the drug testing trend. Suspicionless drug
testing entered America's public schools 6-- albeit in limited form-by
virtue of the Supreme Court's 1995 decision m Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton.7 In Vernonia, the Supreme Court upheld an Oregon school
district's drug policy mandating random testing of student-athletes. Justice
Scalia's opinon for the Court was narrowly drawn and contained limiting
language.' Nevertheless, because the Vernonia Court ruled only on the
conservative policy before it, and declined to articulate clear constitutional
standards for broader suspicionless student policies, the decision has
spawned further litigation.9 Without clear standards to guide them, lower
courts have applied Vernonia inconsistently, if not irreconcilably 10 Five
years after Vernonia, the outer constitutional contours of suspicionless
student drug testing remain very much mdefimte."
Having opened the constitutional door to suspicionless student testing,
Vernonia has predictably given rise to the implementation of drug testing
policies in school districts nationwide. 12 These policies vary m scope, some
applicable only to student-athletes as in Vernonia, others extending further
to include all students participating in extracurricular activities 3 or students
' Drug testing is particularly prevalent m the workplace. See Stephen M. Fogel
et al., Survey of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 553, 561
(1988) (reporting that nearly 50% of the Fortune 500 companies test employees for
drug use).
6 Foran (unsuccessful) earlier attempt at imposing suspicionless student testing,
see Odenhezm v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg ' Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
7 Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
8 See zd. at 665.
9 See discussion infra Part II.
'oSee nfra notes 178-191 and accompanying text.
"See Contradictory court decisions make your rights to test for drug use un-
clear, 29 YOUR SCHOOL& THE LAW, Sept. 10, 1999, at 1.
12 Kentucky is no stranger to student drug testing. See More Schools in
Kentucky TestAthletes forDrugs, EVANSVILLE COURIER& PRESS, Aug. 22, 1999,
at B6 (noting that 17 of Kentucky's 176 school districts have implemented drug
testing policies and predicting that this number will increase); Paul Baldwin, Drug
Tests for High School Athletes Become Routine, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), Apr. 28, 1999, at GI (reporting that more than 1000 Kentucky students had
been tested as of February 1999).
13 See Todd v. Rush County Schs., 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 68 (1998).
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involved in physical altercations.' 4 Some policies have been enacted to
combat demonstrated local drug problems, as m Vernonia; others have
been adopted without any evidence of a local problem at all. Considering
the strong public support for student testing, it is likely that more school
districts will enact policies, 5 some of which are sure to test Vernonla's
reach.'
6
Vernonia's inconsistent application and uncertain boundaries, com-
bined with the expected increase in the number of school districts
implementing drug testing policies, punctuate the significance of a
lingering, fundamental question: what are the constitutional boundaries of
suspicionless student drug testing in America's public schools? 7 Stated
differently, what are the constitutional prerequisites to a valid student
policy9" Tis Note addresses these questions by examining Vernonia and
" See Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1254 (1999).
'" Popular support for expanded student drug testing is reflected m former
presidential candidate Elizabeth Dole's inclusion of broad testing proposals as a
central component of her education plan. See Sandra Sobieraj, Dole Wants Schools
to be Safe, Orderly, DEER-T NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Sept. 24, 1999, at A8.
Cf. Jessica Portner, Drug Testing Latest Tactic in Prevention, EDUC. WK., Apr. 7,
1999, at 1 (noting that more than 100 school districts m 20 states now require drug
testing of student-athletes).
16 At least one Kentucky school district was considering a policy that would
have tested Vernonia's limits. SeeDistrict Employees and Some Students CouldBe
Tested, Associated Press Newswires, Aug. 16, 1999, available in WESTLAW,
8/16/99 APWIRES 22:01:00 (reporting that a proposal to adopt an expansive
policy was pending with the Harlan County Board of Education). That proposal is
no longer pending, but the Harlan County Board plans to implement a policy this
year. See Telephone Interview with Rep. Johnnie Turner, Attorney for the Harlan
County Board of Education (Jan. 13, 2000).
17 A policy could theoretically go so far as to require testing of all students
required to attend school. Whether such a policy is constitutional is the question
understood to be reserved by the Vernonia court. See supra notes 56-59 and
accompanying text. Testing all students would amount to a virtual evisceration of
Fourth Amendment search and seizure protection in the public school context.
Though post-Vernonia decisions have generally looked favorably upon broader
policies, testing all students represents such a radical reading of Vernonia that the
possibility has attracted only passing scholarly attention. See, e.g., John C. Martin,
Note, Drug Testing All Students: The Wrong Answer to a Difficult Question, 6
KAN. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 123 (1997).
The question whether a drug policy is constitutional must be considered on
two levels. First, is the search itself constitutional? Second, is the penalty for
1999-2000]
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its offspring in an effort to deduce the breadth of Vernonza as perceived by
the lower courts. 9 Part I outlines Vernonia itself and considers the
decision's significance." Part II reviews Vernonia's progeny and identi-
fies the questions posed by the evolution of these cases.2 Part III contrasts
Vernonza's various interpretations and concludes that lower courts have
read Vernonza inconsistently, producing incoherent legal standards and
rendering the constitutional limits of suspicionless student testing
incomprehensible.22
I. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J V ACTON:
BROADENiNG THE CLASS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE
SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES
The Supreme Court's 1995 decision m Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton'3 stands as the foundational case in suspicionless student drug
testing?4 In Vernonza, an Oregon seventh-grader refused to consent to
violating the policy constitutional? This Note is concerned with the first inquiry,
which raises questions under the federal Constitution. The second inquiry is largely
a question of state law, wich may present additional hurdles to a policy's
constitutionality. In Kentucky, for example, a policy making school attendance
conditional on a passing drug test would seem to conflict with a student's state
constitutional right to a public school education. See Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky 1989). Such a policy could also be read as
conflicting with state compulsory education laws. See KY. REv STAT. ANN. §
159.010 (Michie Supp. 1998).
'9 This Note is concerned with the evolution of Vernonza as applicable only to
written drug policies that test via unnalysis. The few cases applying Vernoma in
the context of dog sniffs are omitted, primarily because there is considerable
disagreement as to whether a dog sniff constitutes a search for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. Compare B.C. v Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260,
1266 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the Seventh Circuit's conclusion and adopting the
Fifth Circuit's view in holding that a dog sniff is a search under the Fourth
Amendment) with Commonwealth v Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 357 (Pa.) (stating that
"[c]ase law makes clear that a camne sniff is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment"), cert. demedsub nom. Cass v. Pennsylvania, 119 S. Ct. 89 (1998).2oSee infra notes 23-60 and accompanying text.
21 See mnfra notes 61-176 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 177-195 and accompanying text.
' Vemoma Sch. Dist. 47J v Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
24 The Vernonza decision has produced voluminous scholarship. See, e.g.,
Hallam, supra note 3; Irene Merker Rosenberg, Public School Drug Testing: The
Impact ofActon, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV 349 (1996).
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random drug testing, as required to participate m athletics under the local
school district's drug policy The district's policy called for suspicionless
testing via urinalysis. When the school district denied him authorization to
play athletics, the student brought suit in federal district court challenging
the policy's constitutionality The suit alleged that testing under the policy
constituted an unreasonable search m violation of the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.' The United States District Court for the District
of Oregon dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.26
In considering the constitutionality of the school district's drug policy,
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, first outlined why the policy was
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny 27 As the Fourth Amendment is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,2" and because
a unnalysis is a search under the Fourth Amendment,29 the district's drug
policy was subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions. The Court then
announced abalancmg test-the hallmark of the Vernonia decision-as the
standard by which to judge the reasonableness of the challenged search:
At least m a case [challenging a drug test], where there was no clear
practice at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, whether
a particular search meets the reasonableness standard "is judged by
balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental mterests."30
While acknowledging that "reasonableness" generally requires that a
warrant be obtained, and that warrants cannot issue absent probable cause,
the Court noted that a warrant is not always necessary to establish
' See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652. See also U.S. CONST. amend. IV The Fourth
Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id. The school district's policy was also challenged under an analogous provision
of the Oregon state constitution. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652.26See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652.
27See zd.
28See id. (citing Elkins v United States, 364 U.S. 206,213 (1960)).
29 id. (citing Sknmer v Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
617 (1989)).
3
1 Id. at 652-53 (quoting Slanner, 489 U.S. at 619) (footnotes omitted).
1999-2000]
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"reasonableness" and that "when a warrant is not required probable
cause is not invariably required either."3' The Court further noted that it
had recognized the constitutionality of searches on less than probable cause
"when special needs make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable," '32 and moreover that it had recogized "'special needs'
in the public school context."33 The Court cited its earlier decision m New
Jersey v. T.L. O. 34 upholding a public school search lacking probable cause
but supported by "individualized suspicion of wrongdoing." '35 The Court
reiterated its position that "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of suspicion."36 In fact, the Court noted that certain
searches have passed Fourth Amendment muster absent any suspicion at
all.37 Thus, the fact that the school district's policy constituted a
suspicionless search did not compel the conclusion that the policy was
unreasonable.
In assessing the drug testing policy's intrusion on the student's Fourth
Amendment interests, the Court first considered "the nature of the privacy
interest upon which the search intrudes." '3 The Court stated that the
Fourth Amendment protects only socially legitimate expectations of
privacy,39 that students in public schools were children temporarily m the
custody of the state,40 and that "for many purposes 'school authorities ac[t]
in locoparentis."'41 The Court cited mandatory vaccinations as an example
of a necessary intrusion on students' privacy interests m the public school
context 2 and borrowed language from T.L.O. in reasoning that "students
within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than
members of the population generally 4 3 The Court found it significant that
31 Id. at 653.
321 Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
33 Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
3' New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
31 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
361d. (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342).
" See id. at 653-54 (noting that suspicionless searches had been upheld for
railroad personnel and federal customs officers, and m the context of automobile
checkpoint searches for contraband and illegal immigrants).
38 Id. at 654.
39 See zd. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338).
40 See id.
41 Id. at 655 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684
(1986)) (alteration in original).
42See id. at 656-57
43Id. at 657 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348).
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the district's policy did not apply to all students but to student-athletes
only, who the Court found to possess even lesser expectations of privacy 44
"By choosing to 'go out for the team,' [student-athletes] voluntarily subject
themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on
students generally ", 45 Thus, the student-athlete's lowered expectations of
privacy tipped the scales toward a finding of reasonableness.
The Court next considered "the character of the intrusion com-
plained of,"'46 the relevant considerations being the urinalysis procedure and
the information it disclosed.47 As to the procedure, the policy provided for
production of urine samples under limited supervisory conditions-an
environment the Court found no more intrusive than that encountered in
public restrooms. 41 Thus, the policy's urine collection process was deemed
to compromise privacy interests only "negligibl[y]. 49 As to disclosure, test
results were divulged to a limited number of administrators, and positive
tests were not revealed to law enforcement officials. The collection process
did require students to reveal any medications they were taking, however,
a fact the Court acknowledged as concerning but not "per se
unreasonable."50 Weighing these factors, the Court determined that "the
invasion of privacy was not significant."'
Finally, the Court turned to the last variable demanding consideration:
"the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern and the
efficacy of [the drug policy] for meeting it."52 Regarding the nature of the
governmental concern, the Court cited the "severe" effects of drug use
during the school years, the impact of drug-infested schools on the entire
school community, and the increased risk of injury to student-athletes as
supporting the conclusion that "the nature of the concern [was] impor-
tant-indeed, perhaps compelling."53 On the issue of the immediacy of the
governmental concern, the Court deferred to the district court's findings
that the student body was in a "state of rebellion" and that widespread drug
use among student-athletes was fueling disciplinary problems of"epidenmc
" See id. ("Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to student
athletes. School sports are not for the bashful.").
45 Id.
4Id. at 658.
47 See id.
4 See id.
49 Id.
5Od. at 659.
511 Id. at 660.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 661-62.
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proportions." With respect to the efficacy of the means chosen to address
the district's problem, the Court rebuffed the argument that there were
more appropriate means to accomplish the same end-namely, testing upon
suspicion of drug use-noting that it has "repeatedly refused to declare that
only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment."5 5 The Court thus concluded that both the nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern, as well as the policy's efficacy,
strongly supported a finding of reasonableness.
Weighing the various elements under its balancing test, the Court found
the policy to meet Fourth Amendment standards: "Taking into account all
the factors we have considered above-the decreased expectation of
privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the
need met by the search-we conclude Vernoma's policy is reasonable and
hence constitutional." ' 6 But the Court quickly warned that its holding
should not be liberally construed, cautioning "against the assumption that
suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other
contexts."57 Importantly, the Court emphasized the government's unique
relationship vis-a-vis the students-that of "guardian and tutor"--as "[tlhe
most significant element in th[e] case."'58 Justice Ginsburg's concurrence
explicitly recogmzed the limited reach of the Court's decision, emphasizing
the voluntary nature of athletic participation, the mild penalty for testing
positive (suspension from athletic participation), and the limited nature of
the question presented.59
Vernonia added random student drug testing to the short list of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches. The decision stamped
suspicionless student testing with the constitutional imprimatur and assured
school districts nationwide that random testing was permissible-at least
on facts similar to those in Vernona.6' Viewed in hindsight, Vernonia
'4Id. at 663 (quoting Acton v Vemoma Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F Supp. 1354 (D.
Or. 1992)). The Court noted that the school district did not act haphazardly m
unplementing its drug policy. See id. Investigation produced strong evidence of a
drug culture and suggested that use among student-athletes was commonplace. See
id. at 649.
55 Id. at 663 (citing Skinnerv. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
629 n.9 (1989)).
56jd. at 664-65.
57 Id. at 665.
58 Id.
59 See d. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
60 Some commentators have argued that the Vernoma School District's
extensive study and documentation of its drug problem helped persuade the courts
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represents the beginning of a constitutional continuum measuring the
permissible scope of suspicionless student testing. Despite the Court's
inclusion of limiting language, the decision has given rise to a host of
questions concerning the decision's reach. If a school district may test
student-athletes, may it test a broader class of the student population? For
example, may a district test not only athletes but all students participating
in extracumcular activities? May testing be a prerequisite to school
attendance? How far is too far? Predictably, Vernonia gave birth to a short
line of cases testing the constitutional limits of suspicionless student
testing. Analysis of the decision's progeny follows and compels these
conclusions: first, Vernonia has been extended; second, its application has
been inconsistent; and third, its outer limits are obscure.
II. VERNONIA'S PROGENY'
EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF
SUSPICIONLESS STUDENT TESTING
As applicable to student drug testing policies, four cases comprise
Vernonza's progeny The cases address the question whether Vernonla may
be applied to sanction more ambitious policies or policies enacted under
different conditions from those faced in Vernonia. Individually, the cases
raise fundamental questions respecting post-Vernonia standards for
suspicionless student testing. Collectively, the cases illustrate Vernonia's
complexity
A. Todd v Rush County Schools: 6' Is Testing Not Restricted to Student-
Athletes?
The Supreme Court's holding in Vernonia made clear that schools
could constitutionally test student-athletes but reserved the question
whether broader policies may be constitutional as well. The absence of
clear constitutional limits thus allowed local school districts to test
that its policy was both necessary and reasonable and that the governmental
concern at issue was strong. See, e.g., Charles J. Russo & Timothy J. Ilg, Drug
Testing ofStudents: SuggestionsforSoundPolicyDevelopment, 134 Ed. Law Rep.
435 (July 8, 1999). This sentiment is reflected by the fact that most drug testing
policy development guides advise school districts to conduct extensive
documentation and study before implementing a drug policy. See id. at 436.
6'Todd v. Rush County Schs., 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct
68 (1998).
1999-2000]
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Vernonia's outer bounds. The Seventh Circuit was presented with such a
test m 1998, m the form of Todd v. Rush County Schools. In Todd, a high
school student brought suit challenging the local school board's drug
testing policy, which required subrmssion to random drug testing as a
prerequisite to participation in extracumcular activities.62 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted the school
district's motion for summary judgment.3 The student then appealed to the
Seventh Circuit.
64
The drug policy challenged in Toddwas significantly broader than that
upheld in Vernonza in three notable respects. First, the policy at issue in
Todd subjected a greater population of the student body to testing and
expanded the list of drugs detected. Most significantly, the policy applied
to all students participating m extracurricular activities, not just student-
athletes.65 Additionally, the policy tested for alcohol and tobacco--not just
illegal drugs.6 Second, sanctions for failing a drug test were much more
severe in Todd. Though the consequences for failing a test in Vernonia
were-at worst-inability to participate in athletics,67 under the Todd
policy a second failed test could result m disciplinary action by the
school.6" Third, unlike the Vernonza policy, which was enacted m response
62 See id. at 984.
63 See Todd v. Rush County Schs., 983 F Supp. 799 (S.D. Ind. 1997), afl'd 133
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 68 (1998).
64 See Todd, 133 F.3d at 984-85.
65 See id. at 984. Actually, the Todd policy was even broader. The policy also
provided that a student failing a drug test could not drive to or from school. See id.
In Todd, all students initially consented to a drug test. If a failing result was
reported, the student was not eligible to participate m extracurricular activities and
driving privileges to and from school were revoked. See id. at 985. By contrast, m
Vernonza students were subjected to drug tests only if they first elected to
participate in athletics. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650
(1995). The Todd court did not rule on the question of whether revocation of
driving privileges after failing a drug test is constitutional. The court simply stated
that because plaintiffs were challenging the policy only in order to participate in
extracurricular activities, they need not address the issue. See Todd, 133 F.3d at
985-86 n.1.66 See Todd, 133 F.3d at 984.
67 See Vernonza, 515 U.S. at 651.
68 See Todd, 133 F.3d at 985. The Todd policy had an mdirect relationship to
disciplinary action. A failed suspicionless test could not result in disciplinary action
but could trigger subsequent suspicion-based testing, which carred penalties such
as suspension or expulsion. See id.
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to a drug problem described as "epidemic,"69 the Todd policy was
implemented with little evidence of a drug problem. The school district
relied on an inconclusive research study and scant anecdotal evidence as
the basis for its policy 70
Despite these differences in the Vernonza and Todd policies, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. The opinion was brief and cursory In support
of its conclusion, the court noted that extracurricular activities, like
athletics, "require healthy students,"71 that, as m Vernonia, the policy
mandated drug testing for voluntary activities only, and that extracurricular
students, like athletes, were role models who serve as examples to others.72
After noting these similarities, the court concluded that the "Rush County
Schools' drug testing program [was] sufficiently similar to the program[ ]
m Vernonia to pass muster under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. 73
This conclusion may be attacked on at least two grounds, however. For
one, the similarities relied upon between the Todd and Vernonza policies
seem grossly overshadowed by their differences, as outlined above.
Undeniably, the Toddpolicy was much broader on its face in that it reached
not only athletic participation, but all extracurricular activities. Sec-
ond-and more importantly-the Todd court declined to apply Vernonia's
clearly articulated balancing test. Instead, the court in Todd limited its brief
analysis to a consideration of the similarities between the two policies, the
concern for the health of the district's students, and the voluntary nature of
participation in extracurricular activities.74 These factors are but a few of
the many considerations to be weighed under the Vernonia balancing test,
however-a point that was not lost upon at least one Seventh Circuit
judge.75
Thus, the Seventh Circuit extended Vernonia m a brief opinion that
failed to apply the test announced m the case on which it purported to rely
Despite its assailable outcome, Todd expanded the limits of public school
drug testing, at least in the Seventh Circuit.
69 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
70 See Todd, 133 F.3d at 985.
71 Id. at 986.
72 See id.
73 Id. at 986-87
74See d. at 986.
's See Todd v Rush County Schs., 139 F.3d 571, 573 (7th Cir.) (en banc)
(Wood, J., dissenting) (denying a petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
68 (1998).
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B. Trinidad School District No. 1 v Lopez: 6 A "Nexus" Require-
ment?
Vernoma was next applied m Trinidad School District No. 1 v. Lopez,
decided in 1998 by the Colorado Supreme Court. The question presented
in Trinidad was akin to that in Todd whether Vernoma could be read as
sanctioning drug testing not only for student-athletes but for all students
participating in extracurricular activities. Though the Trinidad policy
nominally applied to extracurricular activities only, in practice the policy
required testing of students in "regular class[es]," at least in one instance."
In this respect the policy went even further than in Todd.7s
In Trinidad, plaintiff Lopez, a high school senior, refused to consent to
random drug testing pursuant to the local school district's drug policy and
was subsequently denied authorization to participate in the school's
marching band. As a result, Lopez was precluded from enrolling in a "for-
credit" music class.79 Lopez sued, challenging the suit on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds.
80
76 Trndad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998) (en bane).
77 See id. at 1105. The Trinidadpolicy required all sixth through twelfth-grade
students to submit to drug testing before participating in their first extracumcular
activity in a given year and at any time thereafter upon reasonable suspicion. See
id. at 1098. The policy tested only for drugs, not alcohol. See id. at 1100. It also
required that students disclose any prescription drugs they were taking. See id. at
1098. The tests were administered by an independent firm and consisted of a
urinalysis drawn in open-stalled bathrooms. Positive test results were released to
only a very few persons: the district's superintendent, the local school principal,
and the activity coach or sponsor. See id. at 1100.
78 In Todd, it is impossible to tell from the court's description of the policy
whether it too might have applied to some students taking courses in the regular
curriculum. The Todd court presumably was not faced with that question since it
was not raised. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 985-86 n.1.
71 See Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1107
" See id. at 1097 Lopez challenged the drug testing policy on other grounds as
well; specifically, he argued that the policy violated Article II, Section 7 of the
Colorado Constitution and was unconstitutionally vague. The trial court ruled that
the policy was not unconstitutionally vague. See id. However, the Supreme Court
of Colorado specifically stated that its decision was predicated on interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, they need not decide whether the policy also
violated the Colorado Constitution. See id. at 1097-98 n.5.
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After finding that the case was not moot,8 the court immediately
recogmzed the broad sweep of the policy-
[W]e first analyze the actual scope of the Policy. Trinidad High School
offers two elective band classes, a brass/percussion class and a wood-
winds class. Both of these classes are for-credit classes and are graded. A
student enrolling in either or both of these classes is required to participate
in the marching band and a student's grade depends in part on the
student's performance in the marching band. Conversely, m order to
participate m the marching band, a student must enroll in one or both of
the band classes. Thus, while a cursory reading ofthe Policy indicates
that it reaches only those students who are participating in voluntary
extracurricular activities, the real scope of the Policy is not so limited.
Under the Policy, students who are enrolled in a regular class must
provide a urine sample for drug testing.82
The court noted that Vernonia established a "framework" 83 for analyzing
the constitutionality of suspicionless student testing and identified the
controlling nature of Vernonza's "three factor test."" The court then
applied the test by analyzing its three factors: first, the "nature of the
privacy interest' 85 intruded upon; second, the "character of the intrusion";86
and tlurd, the nature and immediacy ofthe "governmental concern" and the
efficacy of the policy m meeting it.
87
With respect to the "nature of the privacy interest"88 mvaded by the
Trzndadpolicy, the court cited two factors as supporting its conclusion that
8 See id. at 1102. The issue of mootness recurs in this line of cases wherein
students challenge drug testing policies. Given the long duration of litigation
today-two to three years is quite common-it is not surprising that a student may
graduate before his or her case can be heard. Here, Lopez had graduated from high
school before the time of argument The court found the case to fit into both the
"capable of repetition yet evading review" and "great public importance"
exceptions to the mootness doctrine. See id.82 d. at 1104-05 (emphasis added).
83 .1d.
"Id. at 1106. The Trnzdadcourt thus used different nomenclature in describing
Vernonia 's rule. The Vernoma Court had called it a "balancing test." See Vemoma
Sch. Dist. 47J v Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995).
85 Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1106.
861d. at 1108.
87 See id. at 1108-10.
88Id. at 1106.
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"the students tested [under the Trinidad policy] had higher privacy
expectations than the students in Vernonza."89 First, the degree of
"communal undress"90 required for participation in athletic activities is
much Igher than that required for participation in the band: "one can
hardly argue that the marching band is 'not for the bashful.'"9 Second, the
Trinidad policy covered not only those students voluntarily electing to
participate in athletics but, in some cases, students enrolled in "for-credit"
courses as well. In the court's view, "the type of voluntariness to which the
Vernonia Court referred does not apply to students who want to enroll in
a for-credit class that is part of the school's cumculum."92 Turning then to
the test's second factor-the "character of the intrusion"9 -the court found
the Vernonia policy analogous. While questioning Vernonia's likening of
the unnalysis procedure to everyday use of the restroom, the court
conceded that "the analysis set forth in Vernonza dictates that we treat the
intrusion [in Trnidad] as negligible." 94
The court most significantly distinguished Vernonia in considering the
test's third factor: the governmental concern at issue and the efficacy of the
district's policy in addressing it. Though accepting the trial court's finding
that the district's concern was "important-indeed perhaps compelling,' 5
the court took exception to its analysis:
[T]he trial court failed to give proper weight to three important facts: 1)
that the Policy swept within its reach students who were enrolled in for-
credit, instrumental music classes and participated m the marching band,
2) that the Policy included student groups that were not demonstrated to
have contributed to the drug problem in the District, and 3) that there was
no demonstrated risk of immediate physical harm to members of the
marching band.
96
Unlike the Vernonza Court, which attempted to justify testing student-
athletes in part by citing their status as role models, the Trinidad court
found such justification unsatisfactory From their perspective, "simply
89Id. at 1107
9 Id.
91 Id. (quoting Vemoma Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995)).
92 Id.
91Id. at 1108.
94Id.
95 Id. (quoting Vernona, 515 U.S. at 661).
96Id. at 1109.
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being a role model by virtue of participation m an extracurricular activity
is insufficient to support a conclusion that the school's mandated drug
testing program was reasonable."'97 Moreover, Vernoma's emphasis on the
voluntary nature of extracurricular participation was impliedly questioned.
The court noted that though participation m extracurricular activities is "on
a technically volunteer basis,""8 such thinking is, in fact, misleading;
extracurricular participation is necessary to provide experience for those
students wishing to matriculate to college or to "pursue professional
vocations.""
Having evaluated the relevant factors, the court then weighed them.
Balancing the respective interests-the lugher privacy expectations ofband
members as compared to athletes, the negligible intrusion upon the
band members' privacy, and the overly intrusive drug policy chosen to
address the problem-the court found the policy unconstitutional. "Based
on our analysis of all of these factors, [the court] conclude[s] that the
Policy is not reasonable and thus cannot stand under the United States
Constitution. '' l°°
The significance of the Trnidad decision transcends its mere afffima-
tion of Jernonza's balancing test as the proper analytical framework for
assessing the constitutionality of suspicionless student testing policies. To
the Trnidad court, it was insufficient that there was a well-documented
drug problem m the school district; there was no evidence of drug use
among band members.' To the contrary, the band director and a school
board member testified that drug use was not a problem among band
members and that band members were comparatively well-behaved as
measured against the general student body' 02 There was no empmcal
support of any linkage between participation m band and drug use;
although the district had commissioned an independent research study that
reported high drug use m the district's schools, the study did not "quantify
the level of drug use among participants m the various extracurricular
activities. ' 'l °i Though the lack of any linkage between band members and
the district's drug problem clearly carred weight, the Trnidad court
confined itself to Vernonza's test, placing its implicit linkage requirement
97 Id. (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997)).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100Id. at 1110.
01 See id. at 1109.
o2 See id.
'0 3 1d. at 1099 n.8.
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under the rubric of Vernonia's "governmental concern" factor.1 4 However
placed, it remains that the Trinidad court appears to have read Vernonia as
requiring consideration of a fourth factor: the requirement that there be
some sort of "nexus" linking the documented drug problem with those
students tested under the policy 105
The Trinidad decision suggests the possibility that other courts may
adopt a similar approach in applying Vernonia. Such a judicial embrace of
Trinidad's "nexus" requirement would serve to raise the constitutional bar
for school districts attempting to establish a policy's constitutionality As
a procedural matter, reading a "nexus" requirement into the Vernonia
framework would appear to require school districts to conduct pre-
implementation drug use studies in order to establish an empirical linkage
between a district's drug problem and those students subject to testing.
Recent decisions make no mention of a "nexus" requirement, however.
10 6
C. Willis v Anderson Community School Corp: 07 Must a Suspicion-
based Regime Be Impractical?
The next major battle over the constitutionality ofsuspicionless student
testing was Willis v. Anderson Community School Corp., decided by the
Seventh Circuit in 1998. l 1 Iromcally, the Seventh Circuit was presented
with Willis only one year after rendering the Todd decision, the first major
extension of Vernonia in the lower federal courts. 19
In Willis, high school freshman Willis was suspended for fighting and
subsequently refused to submit to testing as called for under the drug
testing policy of the local school board equivalent (the "Corporation").
Consequently, he was suspended a second time and advised that if he
refused to be tested upon Is return he would face a third suspension or
even expulsion. Willis sued, challenging the Corporation's drug policy on
'4See id. at 1108-09.
'o
5 See id. The label used to describe this requirement is borrowed from Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Vernoma. See Vernoma Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 685 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the far more reasonable
choice would [be] to focus on the class of students violat[ing] published school
rules against severe disruption in class and around campus-disruption that had a
strong nexus to drug use") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
'6See infra Parts II.C-D.
107 Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1254 (1999).
log See id.
" See supra Part I.A.
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Fourth Amendment grounds. After the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana ruled m favor of the Corporation, Willis
appealed to the Seventh Circuit."'
The Willis policy was unlike those challenged m earlier cases m that
the policy conspicuously targeted a very specific and identifiable student
population: disruptive students. Specifically, the policy required drug and
alcohol testing via unnalysis for any student who was caught with tobacco,
was suspended for three days or more for fighting, was habitually truant,
or violated any other school rule resulting m at least a three-day suspen-
sion.111 The Willis policy was also notable--and distinguishable from the
Vernonza,'12 Todd,"' and Tnnidad ' 4 cases-m two other respects. First, the
sanctions for failing to comply with the testing policy were much more
severe: refusal to seek counseling after testing positive brought expulsion,
and failure to submit to testing was deemed an admission of unlawful drug
use. 115 Second, there was mimunal evidence of a drug problem m the school
district.'16
The Willis court began by addressing the somewhat novel argument
that suspicionless searches should be upheld only upon a showing that
suspicion-based searches are impractical under the circumstances. The
Vernorna Court had given little consideration to the matter, noting only that
the "[the Court] ha[s] repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least
intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable 117 and that, in any event,
suspicion-based searches were less advisable under the conditions faced in
110 See Willis, 158 F.3d at 417
111 See id. The policy also provided for testing of any student upon "reasonable
suspicion." Because the drug policy provided for both suspicion-based and
suspicionless drug testing, the court supplied a bifurcated analysis. First, the court
noted that testing upon reasonable suspicion was constitutional under New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325(1985). The court rejected the Corporation's argument that
fighting itself was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, however, holding
instead that this determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. See Willis,
158 F.3d at 419 (noting that "while the Corporation's own statistics suggest some
relationship between the use of illegal substances and fighting, the relationship is
by no means conclusive").
112 See supra Part I.
,3 See supra Part ll.A.
See supra Part II.B.
15 See Willis, 158 F.3d at 417
16 See Id. at 418-20.
17Vemoma Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995).
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Vernonia."I The Fourth Amendment picture had since been clouded by the
Supreme Court's opimon m Chandler v. Miller, 9 however, which
suggested that suspicion-based testing must be shown Impractical under the
circumstances in order for a suspicionless approach to pass constitutional
muster. The Willis court determined that the practicality of suspicion-based
testing was not to be analyzed independently, but should be assessed within
the context of Vernonia's established test. 2 Significantly-and quite
inexplicably-the Seventh Circuit in Willis endeavored to apply Vernonza's
balancing test, something it had not done in Todd.
Considering the nature of the privacy interest at stake,12' the court
reiterated the finding--developed in Vernonia and Todd-that students in
public schools have a lower expectation of privacy as measured against the
general population. The court found the facts before it to be distinguishable
from Vernonia's in two significant respects, however. First, the targeted
students were not exposed to "communal undress," as m Vernonia. m
Second, unlike Vernonta and Todd, where testing was linked to participa-
tion in voluntary activities (athletic and extracurricular, respectively), the
Corporation tested students suspended for fighting-an activity the Willis
court deemed to be inherently involuntary." The court reasoned that under
the Willis policy, students "[could not] be described as voluntarily engaging
in misconduct," 4 at least not under the terms of the Corporation's policy-
[In Vernonia], the Court noted a series of steps that an athlete had to take
in order to compete. This course of conduct presumably indicates
forethought and at least some appreciation of all that participation in an
extracurricular activity entails. We doubt that this degree of consider-
1 8 See Id. at 663-64.
9 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
120 See Willis, 158 F.3d at 421 ("[W]e will not short-circuit the special needs
inquiry by focusing solely on the practicality of the search. Instead, we examine
each of the factors set forth in Vernonia.").
2 The Willis court did not consider the "character of the intrusion" factor in its
analysis of the student's privacy interest because Willis had not contested the
intrusion. The court stated that for this reason, and because the intrusion appeared
to be no more intrusive than that m Vernonza, it would presume that the intrusion
was not significant. See id. at n.3.
" See id. at 422. The court noted that the Todd court "apparently did not
consider 'communal undress' to be a significant distinction between athletics and
other extracurricular activities." Id. (citing Vernonta, 515 U.S. at 657).
'23 See id.
124 Id.
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ation-and certainly tins appreciation of the consequences-characterizes
the typical fight between fifteen year-olds.
[T]he Corporation does not rely on the proverbial "who started if'
in deciding when to suspend after a fight. In other words, the
Corporation suspends the victim ofthe instigator, provided that the victim
fights back. Certainly the decision to return a punch-often made m less
time than it takes the aggressor to deliver the second blow-cannot be
analogized to the sort of measured conduct or degree of control discussed
m Vernonta.
125
Due in part to the involuntary nature of the activity linked to testing, the
court concluded that, while the targeted student population had a lower
expectation of privacy as compared to the general public, "their privacy
interest [was] nonetheless stronger than that of the students discussed in
Vernonza and Todd."'26
The court then considered the governmental need at issue. Alluding to
the general hazards of drug use and the special danger drugs pose in the
school context, the court acknowledged an "overwhelming temptation. .to
make the importance of deterrng drug use among schoolchildren the
beginning and end of [its] analysis."127 But the court resisted the impulse,
noting that if deterrence were the only consideration, Vernonza might well
have sanctioned blanket testing, and "this it did not do.1 28 Rather, the court
cautioned against the possibility of a case-by-case expansion of Vernonza,
insisting that "deterrence is msufficient' 1 9 to justify the Corporation's drug
policy 3o Having warned that the drug policy could not be supported on
deterrence grounds alone, the court nevertheless found the Corporation's
concern to be substantially similar to that in Vernonza and Todd.'
31 Though
the Corporation's drug problem in no way approached the "epidemic" level
,2 Id. Tis language is curious because it contradicts-though it attempts to
distinguish-Justice O'Connor's suggestion, voiced in her Vernonia dissent, that
testing students who had committed severe infractions would be more appropriate
because such a policy would "[give] students control, through their behavior, over
the likelihood thatthey wouldbe tested." Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 685-86 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
126 Willis, 158 F.3d at 422.
127 j d.
.2 Id. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
,29 Id. at 423.
130 See id.
131 See id.
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found in Vernonia, the Corporation did "craftl ] its policy to target the
narrow group of students that it perceived as most at nsk for substance
abuse."'' The court therefore concluded that, "the nature and immediacy
of the Corporation's concern [was not] meaningfully less than that of the
Vernoma School District."'
133
The court, however, did find a "sharp contrast ' '134 between the efficacy
of the Willis policy and the efficacy of the policies in Vernonza and Todd,
reasoning that the Corporation's failure to show the impracticality of a
suspicion-based regime was fatal to its attempt to impose a suspicionless
one. 3 5 To the Willis court, due consideration of the Vernonza test's
"efficacy" element required at least some inquiry into the practicality of a
suspicion-based policy because, though suspicionless regimes had been
upheld in exceptional circumstances, "the Supreme Court has not sanc-
tioned blanket testing" and "has [not] renounced the proposition that the
Fourth Amendment normally requires individualized suspicion."'3 6 Having
found it necessary to consider the practicality of a suspicion-based regime,
the court reasoned that such an approach was indeed practical on the facts
of Willis.' 7 For one, the court noted that Indiana law generally required a
student to meet with school officials before suspension,' a requirement
that provided "an opportunity to observe the child and determine
whether there is a reasonable suspicion of substance dbuse."'139 The
Corporation's opportunity to develop suspicion through this mandatory
pre-suspension meeting thus frustrated the Corporation's attempt "to show
a special need that warrant[ed] abandonment of the Fourth Amendment's
usual requirements."'4 ° In the court's view, the practicality of a suspicion-
based regime under the unique facts of Willis outweighed any similarities
to the Vernonza and Todd policies:
The scenario prescribed by state law-an individualmeeting between
the wrongdoer and a high-ranking agent of the school distnct---dis-
tinguishes this case from those in which the Supreme Court has permitted
1
32 Id.
133 [d.
134 1d.
'
35 See Id. at 424-25.
116 Id. at 423.
137 See id. at 425.
13 See id. at 423-24.
139 Id. at 424.
140 id.
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suspicionless drug testing. [W]ith respect to Vernonia (and Todd), it
was of course infeasible for the Dean of Students or a smiilar disciplinary
figure to meet individually with all the students participating in athletics
(or other extracurricular activities).
[W]e are convinced that the Corporation's policy addresses a
concern that can be tackled by means of a traditional, suspicion-based
approach.
141
Having considered the various factors under the Vernonia test-and
finding the nature and immediacy of the government's concern to be
analogous to that m Vernonia (but both the policy's efficacy and the
individual's privacy interest to be very different)-the Willis court found
the Corporation's drug policy unconstitutional. Recognizing that it might
be "precluding suspicionless drug testing for students who [were] far less
sympathetic than those in Vernonia or Todd,"'42 the court nonetheless
rationalized that some boundaries must be drawn so as to stay within the
constitutional confines of Vernonza.
The Willis decision is highly instructive. On a lesser level, the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged Vernonia's test as the proper analytical framework
to be employed in considering the constitutional propriety of suspicionless
student drug testing policies. In this sense the Seventh Circuit did an about-
face from the Todd decision, where its analysis was characterized by
hallow comparisons to Vernonia's facts. Of greater Unportance, Willis
implied that a suspicion-based regime must be impractical for a
suspicionless policy to be constitutional. Willis seems to contradict
Vernonia on tius point. 4 Developments m the suspicionless drug testing
case law-notably the Chandler"M decision-may explain the centrality of
this "practicality" consideration m the Willis opinion.
Willis is most noteworthy, however, in that it represents the first
decision to consider the potential "slippery-slope" effects of Vernonia.
In extending the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permis-
sible suspicionless searches"'45-- without articulating clear boundaries-
141 Id.
421d. at 425.
'43 Vernonia suggested that the practicality of suspicion-based testing has no
bearing on the constitutionality of a suspicionless testing policy. See supra note 55
and accompanying text.
'44 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
4.5 Willis, 158 F.3d at 423.
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Vernonia may be said to have nudged the student drug testing ball down an
endless constitutional hill. In its balancing test, Vernonia provided a ready
framework by which to keep the ball rolling: a court seeing fit to extend
Vernonia need only balance the scales as it may please to reach the desired
outcome. The same court could support its conclusion by noting similarities
between the challenged policy and the policy upheld in Vernonza. To its
credit, the Willis court explicitly recognized the potential threat of never-
ending Vernonia extensions to the Fourth Amendment in the school
context:
Vernonza might as well have sanctioned blanket testing of all children m
public schools. And this it did not do.
This tips up the related need to carefully examine the group to which
the testing policy applies. For one insidious means toward blanket testing
is to divide students into several broad categories ("extracurmcularites, "
troublemakers, etc.) and then sanction drug testing on a category-by-
category basis. (And the very data relied on by the Corporation
reports a relationship between "isolating self' and drug and alcohol use,
so perhaps we should not be so quick to assume that a school district wil
not try to clear a path for testing these non-participating students as
well.)
146
In tacitly recognizing Vernonza's indefiniteness, the Willis court
provided a poignant illustration of Vernonia's potential abuse and
displayed a heightened sensitivity to its unwarranted extension. Most
significantly, the Willis court perceived blanket testing to fall clearly
outside the constitutional limits of suspicionless student testing. 147
D. Miller v Wilkes: 48 Must There Be Evidence of a Drug Problem?
The Eighth Circuit's 1999 decision in Miller v. Wilkes represents the
most recent application of Vernonza in the student drug testing context.
Though the decision has dubious precedential value-the case was
disnussed as moot per order on reheanng 49-- the reported opinion is
nonetheless informative.
' Id. at 422-23 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See id. at 425.
14' Miller v Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574, vacated as moot, 172 F.3d 582 (8th Cir.
1999).
'49 See id. at 582.
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InMiller, an Arkansas high school student sued the local school district
(Cave City Schools) after he was barred from participating m extracurricu-
lar activities. The student had withheld consent to random drug testing,
which was required under the district's drug policy The policy provided
for random testing via urnalysis for students m grades seven through
twelve. Though sanctions stemming from a failed test were comparatively
mild,150 any student withholding consent was ineligible to participate m
extracurricular activities. 51 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas granted summary judgment to the school district.
Miller appealed."5 2
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit identified the controlling nature of
Vernonia. The court then applied Vernonia's balancing test, weighing" 'the
scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy' and 'the character of the
intrusion that is complained of' against 'the nature and immediacy of the
governmental concern and the efficacy of [suspicionless testing] for
meeting it.' 153
The court first considered the "privacy side of the scale." '' With
respect to the expectation of privacy element, the Eighth Circuit reiterated
the Vernonia Court's holding that "children in the public school setting
have a lower expectation of privacy than do ordinary citizens." '155 Though
recognizing that the Miller policy was more expansive than Vernonza's-it
was applicable not only to athletic activities but to all extracurricular
activities generally-the court dismissed this difference as insignificant:
"[A]s with athletics, there are features of extracurricular but non-athletic
... A failing test resulted m a 20-day probationary period during which the
student was recommended to seek counseling. After 21 days the student was
retested. A second positive test resulted in the student being prohibited from
participation in extracurricular activities for one year. See id. at 575-76.
'-" Some commentators have misconstrued the true scope of the Miller
policy-reporting that it required testing of all students-and consequently have
overstated the decision's significance. It is not entirely accurate to say that Miller
upheld testing for all students; rather, because a student withholding consent to
random testing suffered only loss of the right to participate in extracurricular
activities, the policy is similar in scope to the Todd and Miller policies. See, e.g.,
District May Drug Test All Public School Students 8th Circuit Rules, 29 YOUR
SCHOOL & THE LAw, May 14, 1999 at 1.
112 See Miller, 172 F.3d at 576-77
153 Id. at 578 (quoting Vemoma Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660
(1995)).
154 Id.
1
55 Id.
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school activities that will lower the privacy expectation to a point below
that of fellow students." '56 The Miller court's conclusion on this point
thus mirrored those in the earlier opinions.157 The court's analysis of
the "character of the intrusion" element also followed the earlier opm-
ions. Noting that the policy was "no more intrusive on the privacy rights
of students than the one in Vernonia,"'58 the court found its intru-
sive effects "negligible." Regarding the other aspect of the policy's
intrusive effect-the "information it discloses concerning the state of
the subject's body, and the materials [the person] has mgested" 159-- the
court found the policy to be "on point" with that in Vernonia. In sum, the
court found the privacy-invasive elements of the Miller policy analogous
to those in Vernonia and thus weighing in favor of the policy's constitu-
tionality
The court then turned its attention to the other side of the scale under
Vernonza's test-the "'nature and immediacy' of the concern and 'the
efficacy of [random testing] for meeting it.' ,6 Outlining the many ills of
drug use in public school systems, the court found the nature of the
governmental concern "no different" than that in Vernonia. 16 Assessing the
policy's immediacy, however, the court stated that the absence of any
evidence of a drug problem in the district's schools significantly distin-
gtushed the case from Vernonia:
We must acknowledge that there is not the same "immediacy"
here as there was m Vernonia, and this is where the facts before us differ
most significantly from those the Supreme Court faced when declaring
Vernonia's drug testing policy to be constitutional. There is no "immedi-
ate crisis" m Cave City public schools; indeed, there is no recordevidence
of any drug or alcoholproblem in the schools.162
156 Id. at 579.
157 See supra Parts II.A-C.
158 Miller, 172 F.3d at 579.
159 Id. at 579-80. The Miller court did note, however, that like the policy in
Vernonia, the Miller policy required students to disclose prescription medication
they were taking. Here too the court referenced Vernonia, stating that they saw no
reason why confidentiality could not be maintained. Thus, the court followed
Vernonia m refusing to find that this aspect of the policy makes it per se
unreasonable. See id. at n.5.
1
6 1 Id. at 580 (alteration m original).
161 See id.
162 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Nonetheless, the court did not consider tis difference to be determinative,
as the lack of any evidence of a drug problem "[did] not mean that the need
for deterrence [was] not Imperative."'16 This distinguishing factor, then, did
not "necessarily push the Miller policy into unconstitutional territory "64
To the contrary, the court reasoned, drug use m schools is a "serious social
problem today in every part of the country "65 Therefore, a school district
need not wait until "there is a demonstrable problem before the district
is constitutionally permitted to take measures that will help protect its
schools." 6 The court thus concluded that the absence of a drug prob-
lem-that is, the lack of any "immediacy" with respect to the governmental
concern-did not by itself invalidate the district's policy It was enough
that" 'thepossible harm against which the [district sought] to guard [was]
substantial.' "167 In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily on
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,161 where suspicionless
drug testing of customs officials was held constitutional despite the absence
of any evidence of a drug problem.
Having analyzed the various elements, the court then balanced the
competing interests-the "minimal intrusion on the lowered expectation of
privacy against the district's concern and the essentially unchallenged
efficacy of its policy"'69-- and found the Miller policy to pass Fourth
Amendment scrutiny Like the Vernonia Court, the Eighth Circuit
explicitly identified the fact that the testing involved children in the public
school context as central to its ruling.
70
Given the development of the Vernorna line of cases, Miller is subtly
curious for two main reasons. First, and perhaps most significantly, Miller
upheld suspicionless student testing though no drug problem existed. While
the degree of drug use varied among the earlier decisions (in some cases
163 Id.
'64 Id.
16- Id. at 580-81.
66Id. at 581.
'
67 Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 674-75 (1989) (emphasis m original)).
168 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(upholding random drug testing of federal customs officers who carry arms or are
involved m drug interdiction).
169 Miller, 172 F.3d at 581. The court presumed that the Miller policy was
efficacious because Miller had not argued to the contrary. This element of the
Vernoma test thus received only cursory treatment. See id.
"70 See zd. at 581-82 (citing Vernoma Sch. Dist. 47Jv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,665
(1995)).
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being sigmficantly less than that m Vernonia), in each instance there was
at least some evidence of a problem. Miller's negative nplication-that a
drug problem need not be shown for a policy to be "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment-completely eviscerates the "immediacy" element
under Vernonia's balancing test. Under theMiller approach, the ubiquitous
nature and severity of drug use in schools insures that "immediacy" of the
governmental concern is always found. Miller in this sense defies
logic--certainly Vernonza did not intend to articulate a foundational test
requiring consideration of an element that is not variable. If the fact of
nationwide drug use in public schools is sufficient to show "immediacy,"
why consider tis factor at all? That a policy may be constitutional even
absent a present drug problem also contradicts some of the earlier post-
Vernonia opinions.17' For example, Miller's "immediacy" analysis flies in
the face of Trinidad's "nexus" requirement: "72 under the Miller approach,
even where there is no linkage between a student group and a district's
drug problem, it would be enough that the group possessed thepotential for
drug use.
Second, given that both Vernonza and Miller cited the importance of
the school context as central to their holdings, Miller's almost exclusive
reliance on Von Raab 3 is puzzling. Von Raab involved the drug testing of
federal customs officers-a different setting altogether. Miller simply
ignored the school line of cases which, if considered, would have required
a more complex analysis." The court would have been forced to grapple
with Trnidad's "nexus" requirement,75 for instance, or Willis's
"practicality" consideration.'76 Arguably, consideration of the school line
of cases would have produced a different result.
171 The proposition also contradicts at least one decision rendered since Miller
See B.C. v Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260 (9thCir. 1999) (holding that
a suspicionless dog sniffsearch ofigh school students was unreasonable underthe
Fourth Amendment because there was no evidence of a drug problem in the district
and because "the government's important interest in deterring student drug use
would not have been 'placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion"'); zd. at 1268 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997)).
'
7 2 See supra Part II.B.
73ee supra note 168 and accompanying text.
'74 Interestingly, Miller cited both Todd and Willis in a footnote as comporting
with its decision. This is the sole reference to the school line of cases. See Miller,
172 F.3d at 582 n.6.
1' See supra Part I.B.
176 See supra Part II.C.
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HI. SUSPICIONLESS STUDENT TESTING
IN THE WAKE OF VERNONIA
As the foregoing review suggests, it is quite difficult to identify
definitive standards for suspicionless student drug testing. The glanng
uncertainty plaguing this area of the law is largely a consequence of its
infancy; after all, suspicionless student testing was unconstitutional before
Vernonia, a decision not yet five years old. There simply has not been time
for the Vernonia line of cases to significantly evolve, courts having had but
few opportunities to explore Vernonia's outer reach. Also contributing to
the confusion is the limited scope of Vernonza's holding; the policy there
applied to student-athletes only,177 whereas later policies applied not only
to student-athletes but to extracurricular students generally In ruling on
such a conservative policy, Vernonia produced at least as many questions
as it answered. The decision in Vernonia effectively opened the constitu-
tional door to suspicionless student drug testing while giving no indication
as to how far the door was ajar. Vernonia's balancing test has proven to be
an inadequate guide: its malleability has seriously hampered its usefulness
in producing clear standards by which to gauge the constitutionality of
more expansive drug testing policies.
If nothing else, however, it is clear that Vernonia has been extended,
at least in some junsdictions.'7 8 Though Vernonia dealt with student-
athletes only, both the Seventh and Eight Circuits upheld policies
applicable not only to student-athletes but to all students involved in
extracurricular activities. 179 Though the Vernoma School District's drug
problem was severe, other courts have upheld policies under less
"immediate" circumstances. 8 ' Even the Thnidad and Willis opinions
tacitly concede that Vernonia transcends its facts. Thus, its cautionary
rhetoric notwithstanding,' Vernona has been liberally construed.
Vernonza's extension is all the more interesting-and the cause of
present uncertainty is better explained-when one considers the varying
methodologies by which the lower courts have applied the main case.
Faced with drug policies broader in scope, these courts were forced to
... See Vernoma Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
178 No other conclusion can follow from the review of Vernonia 's progeny. See
supra Part II.
9 See supra Parts I.A, II.C.
See supra Parts II.A-D.
See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665 (cautioning against interpreting the decision
too broadly).
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choose one of three ways by which to apply Vernonia: by comparing the
specifics of a challenged policy to the policy held constitutional in
Vernonia, by strictly applying Vernonia's balancing test without regard to
factual comparisons between the challenged and Vernonia policies, or by
somehow combining the two approaches. The first method overlooks
Vernonia's larger significance-its balancing test-which stands as the
foundation of its holding. The second method is faithful to Vernonia's
underlying rationale but potentially misleading: construing Vernonia's test
in a contextual vacuum squanders valuable interpretive currency As
evidenced by the cases discussed in Part II, most courts have chosen the
hybrid approach, using the balancing test as an analytical foundation while
supporting ultimate conclusions by comparing a given policy to
Vernonia's. As the two approaches complement one another, this seems the
preferable method. The failure of lower courts to universally adopt this
approach has contributed to inconsistent results and partly explains the
uncertain constitutional status of more expansive policies.' 2
Disagreement as to the proper placement of the school line of cases
within the suspicionless search body of case law also contributes to the
problem. On the one hand, some courts have conceptualized the school
cases as mere descendants of the other suspicionless drug (but non-school)
decisions: namely, Von Raab,"8 3 Slanner,'" and United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte.18 5 The school cases certainly derive from these earlier decisions, as
the latter served as the basis for the Vernonia decision itself. Perceived this
way, Vernonia and its progeny (the cases discussed in this Note) are mere
extensions of the earlier suspicionless drug testing cases. On the other
hand, at least one court has perceived Vernonia and its offspring as an
entirely new and isolated family of drug policy case law 186 The signifi-
cance of the distinction is not merely semantic. To the contrary, categonz-
182 With respect to the policies at issue in the cases discussed in this Note, the
Todd policy falls into the first category, while the Trinidad, Willis, and Miller
policies fall into the last. See supra Part II.
183 National Treasury Employees Umon v Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). See
supra note 168 and accompanying text.
"8 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(upholding suspicionless drug testing of railroad personnel involved in train
accidents).
185 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding
suspicionless searches at checkpoints looking for illegal immigrants and drugs).
186 See Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1254 (1999).
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mg the school cases in one way or the other has proven outcome-determi-
native.
The Miller case is a perfect illustration. There, the Eighth Circuit relied
heavily on Von Raab in concluding that a district's drug policy may be
constitutional even absent a drug problem."7 Von Raab is indeed strong
authority for this conclusion. The Eighth Circuit could have just as easily
looked to the school cases, however, precedent that would seem to support
the contrary position. In Trnidad, for example, the Colorado Supreme
Court struck down a policy m part because the school district failed to
demonstrate a sufficient link (that is, "nexus") between the district's drug
problem and a class of students tested under the policy (band members).188
By this reasoning, at least some evidence of a drug problem must exist for
a policy to be constitutional. Because the school line of cases had emerged
by the time of the Miller decision-Trnidad among them-the Eighth
Circuit's decision to look to Von Raab misses the mark entirely 189 The
question may rightly be asked: given that Vernonza stressed the signifi-
cance of the school context, 19° why look to Von Raab as opposed to the now
somewhat mature school line of cases? 91 Incongruous perceptions with
respect to the lineage of the school cases has generated confusion as to
applicable precedent, which in turn has produced mconsistent and
unpredictable decisions.
The varying approaches used in applying Vernonza and the different
ways of perceiving the school line of cases have rendered the post-
Vernonza decisions collectively incoherent and, at least in some ways,
irreconcilable. For example, the Seventh Circuit's Todd decision endorsing
drug policies applicable to all extracumcular students could be read as
'
87 See supra Part II.D.
'88 See supra Part II.B.
119 The Miller opinion makes reference only to Todd and Willis, and even then
only m a footnote. See Miller v Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574, vacated as moot, 172 F.3d
582 n.6 (8thCir. 1999).
o See Vemoma Sch. Dist. 47J v Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (making
clear that "[tihe most significant element in [Vernoma] is the first we discussed:
that the [p]olicy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children
entrusted to its care").
9' A supporter of the Miller opinion may well respond that reliance on Von
Raab as opposed to the school cases is appropriate given that the former was
decided by the Supreme Court, whereas of the latter only Vernonza was decided at
that level. Still, the factual similarities between the school cases and Miller would
seem to more than offset any such considerations. See supra Part II.
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conflicting with the Colorado Supreme Court's Trnidad holding that at
least some such policies are unconstitutional. If nothing else, the Trnidad
court perceived limitations on such policies that the Seventh Circuit did
not. Similarly, Trnidad's inference that a demonstrated drug problem is a
prerequisite to a constitutional policy192 contradicts the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Miller that a drug policy may be constitutional even absent a
drug problem. 93 The absence of clear standards and analytical consistency
in this area of the law suggests that future decisions will further contribute
to the confusion.
Present uncertainty requires that any conclusions be cautiously and
delicately drawn. At least a few axioms have emerged from the case law,
however, notwithstanding the general confusion. For one, the constitution-
ality of testing student-athletes cannot be doubted, at least on facts and
terms similar to those found in Vernonia. This was the very question
decided there. Second, policies broader in scope than Vernonia's-such as
those applicable not only to student-athletes but to all extracumcular
activities-are most likely constitutional as well. 94 No court has struck
down a policy solely because it covered students other than student-
athletes. Third, the uniform approach adopted by the various courts with
respect to certain elements of the balancing test allow several definite
conclusions to be drawn. For example, it is now conclusively established
that school children have a lowered expectation of privacy, and that a basic
unnalysis intrudes on a student's privacy interests only negligibly 195
Because these elements are no longer variable, the conclusions of courts
applying the test will differ only if the "nature and nnmediacy" or
"efficacy" elements are dissmilar. Stated differently, the "three-factor" test
now has only two factors.
The law's incoherence in this area is attributable to its unimaturity
Paradoxically, the absence of clear constitutional standards may well
propel a clarification of the post-Vernonia picture: school districts will
continue to implement policies that test constitutional limits, thereby
affording courts more opportunities to articulate lucid standards. The
development of the school line of cases will provide additional decisions
from which to exact rules and draw conclusions. At present, however,
constitutional standards for suspicionless student testing are very much
unclear.
'2See supra Part I.B.
l9 a See supra Part ll.D.
1 See supra Parts H.A, II.D.
195 See supra Part I.
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CONCLUSION
Suspicionless student drug testing was unconstitutional before the
Supreme Court's decision m Vernonza School Distrct 47J v. Acton,196
decided in 1995. The Court there upheld suspicionless testing for student-
athletes under what appeared to be very uique circumstances. In deciding
the case the Court announced a foundational test by which to determine the
"reasonableness" of a suspicionless search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court's test requires that the student's Fourth Amend-
ment privacy interests be balanced against the governmental need at
stake. 19 7 The analysis demands consideration of the student's legitimate
expectation of privacy, the character of the intrusion, the nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, and the efficacy of a
suspicionless policy at meeting this concern. Vernonza's balancing test is
its legacy
With hindsight, it is clear that Vernonza opened a Pandora's Box,
posing more questions than it answered. Vernonia opened the door to
constitutionally permissible suspicionless student searches but did so
without articulating clear standards by which to judge more expansive
policies. Absent clear constitutional standards and boundaries for
suspicionless student testing, school districts nationwide have adopted drug
policies that test Vernonza's reach. The Vernorna decision gave rise to a
short line of cases applying its balancing test.198 Vernonia's progeny
consists of four cases, three decided by federal appellate courts, one by the
Colorado Supreme Court. These courts have read Vernonza inconsistently
and have adopted various methodologies by which to rule on more
expansive drug policies. These decisions are in many ways irreconcilable
and give rise to a host of questions. Whether a suspicion-based regime must
be impractical for a suspicionless policy to be constitutional, whether some
linkage must be demonstrated between a school district's drug policy and
those students tested under a policy, and whether a school district must
prove the existence of a drug problem before enacting a drug policy are
representative questions lingering within the post-Vernonza suspicionless
drug testing case law
The law's present incoherence in this area is attributable to its infancy
The Supreme Court decided Vernonza in 1995, and there has not been
sufficient time for a substantial body of case law to emerge. The conflicting
96 Vemoma Sch. Dist. 47J v Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
,97 See zd.
'98 See supra Parts II.A-D.
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methodologies by which the lower courts have applied Vernonza and the
lack of consensus as to the proper placement of the school line of cases
within the suspicionless testing case law also contribute to the present
incomprehensibility of constitutional standards.
Given the law's infancy and the irreconcilable nature of Vernonia's
progeny, few definitive conclusions may be responsibly drawn. What is
most clear is that constitutional standards for suspicionless student drug
testing are very much uncertain.
